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The debate between the realist and the anti-realist is-in a sense­
the debate between the possibility of pure passive description versus the 
necessity ofinterpretation. The realist argues, broadly, that there is a single 
way the world truly is. Describing this world without the bias of interpre­
tation has been the project of the philosophical realist. The realist hopes to 
engage in what Nietzsche calls "that general renunciation of all interpreta­
tion (of forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, 
falsifying, and whatever else is ofthe essence of interpreting)" (Genealogy 
afMorals, 587). On the other hand, the anti-realist argues that a reduction 
of the world into purely factual propositions is impossible; in other words, 
the anti-realist believes that every proposition about the world involves 
interpretation, so that a solely descriptive account of reality is impossible. 
A potential consequence of the anti-realist position is that there is no single 
'real' way the world is. By this view there is only the variety ofinterpretive 
perspectives. 
My project is to outline a reading ofNi etzsche that allows us to place 
him within these two compcting account.;; ofreality. Nietzsche is commonly 
ignored or misrepresented in contemporary Analytic Philosophy, even 
though he is often credited (Taylor, 1987) with furnishing some of the most 
devastating critiques of Analytic Metaphysics and Epistemology. So, my 
goalis to furnish a miniature map that locates Nietzsche in relation to one 
of the questions engaged by analytic philosophy. I will attempt a textual 
analysis that argues-as many might suspect-that Nietzsche is properly an 
anti-realist because of his view on language and valuation. 
Nietzsche and, lately, Foucault are taken as enemies of Analytic 
Epistemology because they argue that knowledge and the belief-making 
process is guided by wntingentcultural conditions. Since the conditions are 
contingent, there is no way to isolate solid criteria for justified-true-belief or 
whatever. I agree that this is the reason for Nietzsche's distaste for 
Epistemology, but, left unexamined, it potentially leads to what I take to be 
misunderstanding (or understatement) of Nietzsche's anti-realist position. 
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Alan White writes in Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth, "The problem [for 
Nietzsche] ... is not that there are no facts, but that there are too many facts. 
There are too many in that not all can be registered, and not all can be 
interrelated" (48). White argues that human beings are too limited to absorb 
all possible propositions about the world. This limitation requires that some 
propositions be taken seriously at the expense of others, and this taking 
seriously of one proposition over another is an interpretive act, since one 
must interpret which are the serious facts versus the frivolous facts. 
Moreover, the interpretive act is fueled and guided by relations of power in 
a culture. 
My worry is that White's account-and accounts like it--of 
Nietzsche's view offact and interpretation leaves Nietzsche open to attack 
from a savvy correspondence theorist (Cf). The traditional Cf argues that 
a sufficiently powerful "viewer" of the world would be able to collect all 
factual propositions and synthesize them into a single, truthful, perfectly 
corresponding account of reality. Because Nietzsche's position has to be 
reconstructed by stressing the limitation ofhumankind, the correspondence 
theory is left a viable option. Just because human beings now are unable to 
digest all the facts or see all the interrelations or transcend power relation­
ships, the Cf argument would go, nothing is said against the possibility of 
a God's eye viewpoint attainable, by, say, expert honest science as it 
progresses into the future. Recall the position ascribed to Charles S. Peirce: 
Peirce argued that there was a method-the method of science-that could 
overcome the limitations inherent in the ways people "fix their beliefs." 
Where, then, does Nietzsche stand in relation to the objectivity ofscience? 
(Nietzsche gives us a rough hint when he writes, " ... physics, too, is only an 
interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, ifI may say so!) and not 
world explanation; [physics] ... strikes an age with fundamentally plebeian 
tastes as fascinating, persuasive, and convincing--after all, it follows 
instinctively the canon oftruth ofeternally popular sensualism" (BGE, 212) .) 
If we are to take Nietzsche as a full-blown anti-realist, we must 
understand how he evades the optimistic realist's challenge, fueled by a 
position such as Peirce's. In other words, we must investigate whether 
Nietzsche believes that a God's eye view is presently unattainable or that a 
God'seyeviewisinprincipalincoherent. My view is the latter. I shall argue 
that, although White's reading has shown an important sense (pemaps the 
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most important sense) in which Nietzsche is an anti-realist, a deeper anti­
realist tendency can be traced in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Genealogy of 
Morals. I will also engage the traditional argument against relativism-as 
some might think that I am painting Nietzsche as a relativist-and show how 
Nietzsche evades the venerable Socratic charges against the relativist. 
The cr argues that the Truth is correspondence between certain 
linguistic propositions and the way the world really is. In this way, the cr 
feels that a statement such as "there is a tree" is true if, in fact, a tree is in the 
area indicated by "there." Nietzsche's Zarathustra is no friend ofthe cr: the 
correspondence theorist's way of waiting for the truth of the world to come 
to light is to remain "mere spectators ... Like those who stand in the street 
and gape at the people who pass by" (237). Zarathustra charges that these 
'scholars' are as blind to the (sun)light of truth as someone who never leaves 
"dusty rooms." 
Zarathustra gives a more obvious critique of the cr in the Conva­
lescent. He awakens after confronting his most abysmal thought and 
marvels at the chattering of his animals: 
... Are not words and sounds rainbows and illusive bridges 
between things which are eternally apart? ... ForMe-how 
should there be any outside-myself? There is no outside. 
But all sounds make us forget this; how lovely it is that we 
forget. Have not names and sounds been given to things 
that man might find things refreshing? Speaking is a 
beautiful folly: with that man dances over all things (Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, 329). 
The position Nietzsche is suggesting here argues that although words may 
bridge the gap between the self (a single limited human perspecti ve) and the 
world, there can never be a direct correspondence between propositions and 
observations made by the self and factual features about the world: «how 
should there be any outside-myselfl" Zarathustra wonders. We can recon­
struct Nietzsche's argument this way: when anyone uses a word, he or she 
is creating a link between a sound and the world that in no way 'contains' 
the feature of the world picked out. How could a sound 'contain' anything 
but noise? So, if the sound's link to the world is an arbitrary link, there is 
no reason to suspect that the link specifies the essential, true, eternal nature 
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of the world. At best the sound allows speakers to "dance over all things." 
This dancing is not necessarily either careful or precise. 
In Nietzsche's view, it is impossible in principle that dancing over 
all things would allow someone to grasp all things unambiguously. Except 
for the difficult cases ofonomatopoeia, the relationship between sounds and 
the world is contingent. Moreover, the words themselves are not bridges of 
steel and concrete. They are not bridges of permanence, but rather bridges 
made of rainbows and illusions. There is flux in the relationship between 
words and the world and flux in the meanings of words. " ... The form is 
fluid," (the relationship between words and the world) "but the 'meaning' 
[of words considered in isolation from the world] even more so" (Genealogy 
a/Morals, 514). The argument against the cr has two branches. The first 
denies the possibility for a word to link-up with reality in any objectively 
convincing way, and the second denies that any word has a single transcen­
dent meaning. In this way the possibility of a God's eye point of view is 
negated: the complete set of propositions about the world that God would 
have can, at best, be made of concepts that have no fixed meaning; even if 
they did, they could not' contain' all of the features of what they are picking 
out in the world. Again, the reason the containment is impossible is that 
there is no way, when naming things in the world, to capture or contain the 
essential features of the thing in the world. " ... How should there be any 
outside myself. .. ," that is not accessed via" ... illusive bridges ...." 
If it is the case that words are fluid over time, the cr might here 
attempt to "fix the meaning" ofa word-atleasttemporarily-so that a word 
can pick out a distinct feature of the world. This would help the cr in her 
or his project in that it would allow a word with a fixed meaning to 'link to' 
a fixed reference in the world. Given a very powerful mechanism forlinking 
all these fixed references in the world, the cr might think that a God's eye 
perspective is yet possible. 
Nietzsche's suggestion is that the gap between words and world is 
a chasm that cannot be crossed by permanent, solid bridges. In response, the 
cr attempts to make a word-bridge solid by stipulating the meaning of a 
word. This is " ... a metaphysician's ambition to a hopeless position ... " 
(BEG, ~7). Nietzsche evaluates the move to fix a reference as follows: "The 
lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to 
conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part 
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of the rulers: they say 'this is this and this,' they seal every thing and event 
with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it" (OM, 463), The problem, 
in Nietzsche's view, is not that a cr cannot fix the reference of a word, but 
rather that the reference that is fixed is arbitrary. This is another way toward 
White '8 critique offacts, but it brings out more carefully the plight of the cr. 
Where the cr attempts to fix the meaning of a word so that it picks out a 
single thing in the world, what actually happens is that the cr picked out a 
thing in the world and forced that as a meaning ofa word. Ifthis is the case­
if giving names is a lordly right and an act of taking possession-what is 
taken is chosen arbitrarily by the cr. In practical terms, picking out 
something in the world and calling it, for example, a tree ends up not fixing 
any reference: what deteITIlines if the dirt in the five-meter circle around the 
roots is contained in the word 'tree'; or who decides ifleaves and branches 
are part of a tree--or if only the trunk (not counting the bark) is a tree? 
The problem arises when the cr attempts to use this newly 
stipulated word to link to reality and to make the claim that it picks out 
exactly what is really there: ofcourse the word links to a reality, because 
that reality is just what was put into the word. But filling up a word (fixing 
a reference) with an arbitrarily chosen thing goes nowhere in showing that 
lhatmeaning is the single possi ble meaning. At best, fi xing a meaning places 
inside a word a reference that is relevant to some perspective. And, of 
course, there is no reason to suspect that this perspective, powerful in its 
abilily to temporarily fix the meanings ofwords, is able to access the Truth. 
While the cr thinks that he or she has pursued reality outside the cave, 
something else has happened in Nietzsche's view . 
... purposes and utilities [of words for describing the 
world] are only signs that a will to power has become 
master ofsomething less powerful and imposed upon it the 
character of a function; and the entire history of a "thing," 
and organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign­
chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose 
causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on 
the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one 
another in a purely chance fashion (OM, 513). 
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Nietzsche elaborates on the position I am ascribing to him by 
arguing that the meaning of any "thing" or "organ" (or word) is constantly 
contingent-that the appropriation of language by the cr for a certain 
purpose is no more legitimate than the appropriation by anyone else to fix 
the reference in a different way (make the word 'tree', forinstance, describe 
the juxtaposition ofleaves, branches, trunk, roots and a one-foot deep space 
of air around the trunk). How the reference is fixed can "succeed ... in a 
purely chance fashion." Nietzsche's view denies the possibility of some 
way to describe the world that is essentially more right than any other. 
Nietzsche argues that even an exact science of giving more complex and 
complete meanings will fail to get closer to an objective meaning. 
The "evolution" ofa thing, a custom, an organ is ... 
by no means itsprogressus towards a goal ...-buta succes­
sion of more or less profound, more or less mutually 
independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances 
they encounter, the attempts at transfonnation for the 
purpose ofdefense and reaction, and the results of success­
ful counteractions (OM, 514), 
So, subduing a word by fixing its reference docs not further the 
pursuitoftruth as correspondence. All itdoes is su bd ue words in an arbi trary 
way. This is why White argues that "Even to register a fact then, is to 
interpret, in that the registering invol ves the singling out ofthat specific fact" 
(WNL, 48). But this is not solely, as White argues, because there is a 
necessary exclusion ofother facts. Nietzsche's critique of realism is more 
serious: even if there was a mechanism-say, science-that could catalog 
every fact, itis not clear, by Nietzsche's view, what should count as a 'fact'. 
When any proposition is made about the world and held up as an example 
ofa' fact' , the words that comprise that proposition are either in flux or have 
a fixed reference. Ifthey are in flux, then there is no way they can pick out 
one truthful state of affairs in the world. !fthe meaning of the words is fixed 
in the way the cr attempts to fix a reference, all that is fixed is one subjective 
perspective of the world, and thus the proposition does not describe the 
single truthful state of affairs. 
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Traditionally, the cr has held up the curious coincidence between 
the perception and philosophical descriptions made by many cultures. 
Surely, argues the realist, if dividing up the world is a purely arbitrary 
practice, there would be much more diversity in the ways the world is 
divided up. But the absence of this diversity indicates to the realist that 
world/word making is not arbitrary. Nietzsche challenges this inference: 
The strange family resemblance of all Indian, 
Greek, and Gennan philosophizing is explained easily 
enough. Where there is affinity oflanguages, it cannot fail, 
owing to the common philosophy of grammar-I mean, 
owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by 
similar grammatical functions-that everything is pre­
pared at the outset for a similar development and sequence 
of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred 
against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation 
(BOE, ~20). 
Nietzsche recommends that one ought not to conclude from cultural coin­
cidences of' facts' that everyone is latching on to some essential, true feature 
ofLhe world. One ought to conclude from this coincidence only thatthe ways 
ofdividing up world, as they rely on a 'philosophy ofgrammar', come from 
very similnr philosophies of grammar and thus look very similar. 
Nictzsche's view has serious consequence for science, the tradi­
tional tool of the correspondence theorist. Of science, Nietzsche writes, 
"StricUy speaking, there is no such thing as science 'without any presuppo­
sitions' ... a philosophy, a 'faith,' must always be there first of all, so that 
science can acquire from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right 
to cxist" (OM, 587-88), From the correspondence theorist's standpoint this 
view of science would be startling. Science is supposed to be the tool by 
which all references can be fixed and the truth of the world can be told. But 
in light ofNietzsche'S critique or the CTposition. his view on science is not 
surprising at all. Science is engaged in the pursuit of a certain kind of thing 
that it believes-because of the will of some lord of names-to be facts. 
Even if science could collect all ofthese 'facts', what counted as a fact would 
itself be arbitrary. Ofcourse, the plight of the scientist is deepened to a third 
degree when we attempt to make sense of the significance of those things 
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that are called facts. This is White's critique, what I am calling the third 
critique, of the pursuit of truth: " ... as soon as this truth or fact--or any 
other-is selectively registered, the problem of interpretation arises once 
again: what is the significance ofthe fact?" (49). The situation for the realist 
in Nietzsche'S view is precarious. Truth as correspondence loses its 
coherence as Nietzsche points out that the bridge between projX)sitions 
about the world and the world itself are always illusory and tenuous. 
A brief recap ofNietzsche's critique ofcorrespondence theory: A) 
Our only means of describing the world, our only access to the world are 
subjective states and the words used to describe subjective states. Word­
bridges are illusory. B) No description can have a non-arbitrary fixed­
reference. C) Even if the problems of A and B could be solved, the facts 
acquired about the world would need to be placed into some system of 
significance which, by definition, would be subjective (Le. significance to 
whom?). 
If this is Nietzsche's view, one might be tempted to label him a 
relativist. But ifNietzsche is a relativist, he could fall prey to the venerable 
critique against relativism that Socrates used againstProtagoras. Forthe rest 
ofthis paper! will give the framework forperspectivism that Nietzsche more 
rightly fits into. In the process I will show how perspcctivism evades the 
critique of Protagorean relativism. 
Relativism is the position that every proposition about the world is 
as correct as any other proposition. According to the relativist, 'truth' 
depends on your point ofview. When Protagoras articulated a view like this 
Socrates charged him with an incoherence that is now famous: "How could 
you, Protagoras, argue that relativism is true ifrelativism argues that nothing 
is true?" 
Relativism seems to be sclf-refuting because if relativism was right, 
there would be no reason to believe that relativism was right-truth depends 
on your point of view. Whether or not this critique of Protagoras is 
devastating is not clear (I think it is not), but the dangeris that Nietzsche may 
be charged with the same incoherence. Is Nietzsche's perspcctivism just a 
perspective, no more right than any other-say, the correspondence 
theorist's-perspective? 
Although strict relativism is consistent with Nietzsche's point of 
view, it leaves no room for objectivity through diversity. This feature of 
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objectivity through diversity ofperspectives is the way Nietzsche answers 
Protagorean incoherence. The relativist seems to throw his or her hands up 
in the air and proclaim that 'everything is right.' Nietzsche needs to do no 
such thing, as his view allows for valuations to arise from engaging many 
perspectives. In an often cited passage from Genealogy, Nietzsche writes, 
... let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual 
fiction that posited a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless 
knowing subject'; let us guard against the snares of such 
contradictory concepts as 'pure reason,' 'absolute spiritu­
ality,' 'knowledge in itself'; these always demand that we 
should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an 
eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and 
interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes 
seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always 
demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is 
only a perspective seeing. only a perspective 'knowing'; 
and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the 
more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, 
the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 
'objectivity,' be (GM, 555). 
The first halfof the quote is the critique of realism that developed in the first 
halfofthe paper. Alone. it makes Nietzsche sound relativist and thus subject 
to Socrates' s challenge. The second half ofthe quote illuminates Nietzsche's 
view by explaining the role of a variety of perspectives. Not every 
perspective is as right as any other, and the only way to make value 
judgements between perspectives is to be aware ofthe diversity ofper spec­
tives. Our concepts of a thing is made rich by noting as many ofthe possible 
perspectives one can. Only in light of this richness is valuation (viz. 
objectivity) in knowledge possible: 
'objectivity' ... understood not as 'contemplation without 
interest' (which is nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability 
to contro[one'sPro and Con and to dispose ofthem. so that 
one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and 
affective interpretations in the service of knowledge 
(GM,555). 
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So, even though Nietzsche is no realist, he is not a relativist either. This is 
a way in Nietzsche's view to evade the charge of 'everything is correct.' 
Valuation is possible, given a diversity ofperspectives on the world-that 
is, given a diversity in what is considered important and what is considered 
a 'fact.' The framework for perspectivism is one where many views on the 
world are weighed in light of the kind oflife a person wishes to lead and the 
kind ofworld a person wishes to live in. This perspectivism has a strong anti­
realist tendency, but does not leave the anti-realist helpless. 
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